PRINCIPLES OF ELECTORAL LAW DESIGN
OVERVIEW
Electoral system design should engineer a system that encompasses the following characteristics (these principles are elaborated in Design Principles):
1. Ensuring a representative parliament
2. Making elections accessible and meaningful to the average voter
3. Providing incentives for conciliation between previously hostile parties
4. Foster the perceived legitimacy of the legislature and government
5. Help facilitate stable and efficient government
6. Give rise to a system that holds the government and its representatives accountable to the highest degree possible
7. Encourages "cross-cutting" political parties
8. Helps promote a parliamentary opposition
9. Is realistic concerning a country's financial and administrative capacity
In Practical Advice for Electoral System Designers we elaborate on the following points that apply to electoral
system design:
1. Keep it simple, but
2. Don't be afraid to innovate
3. Pay attention to contextual and temporal factors
4. Do not underestimate the intelligence of the electorate
5. Err on the side of inclusion
6. Acknowledge that the process by which an electoral system is chosen can be as important as the final result
7. Try to build legitimacy and acceptance for the system among all key actors
8. Try to maximize voter influence, but
9. Balance that against the need to encourage coherent political parties
10. Note that long-term stability and short-term advantage are not always mutually compatible
11. Don't think of the electoral system as a panacea for all ills, but
12. Conversely, don't underestimate its influence
13. Be mindful of the electorate's willingness to embrace change
14. Avoid being a slave to past systems
15. Assess the likely impact of any new system on societal conflict, and finally
16. Try to imagine unusual or unlikely contingencies.
DESIGN PRINCIPLES
When designing an electoral system, it is best to start with a list of criteria that sum up what you want to achieve, what you want to avoid and, in a broad sense, what you want your parliament and government to look like. The criteria given in Ensuring a Representative Parliament to Promoting a Parliamentary Opposition cover most areas, but the list is not exhaustive and the reader may add a host of equally valid items. It is also true that some of the criteria outlined overlap and may appear contradictory. This is because they often are, and it is the nature of institutional design that trade-offs have to be made between a number of competing desires and objectives.
For example, one may want to provide the opportunity for independent candidates to be elected, and at the same time to encourage the growth of strong political parties. Or the electoral system designer may think it wise to craft a system that gives voters a wide degree of choice between candidates and parties, but this may make for a complicated ballot paper that causes difficulties for less-educated voters. The trick in choosing - or reforming - an electoral system is to prioritize which criteria are most important and then assess which electoral system, or combination of systems, best maximizes these objectives.
Ensuring a Representative Parliament
Representation may take at least three forms:
First, geographical representation implies that each region, be it a town a city, a province, or an electoral district, has members of parliament whom are chosen and whom are ultimately accountable to their area.
Second, a parliament should be functionally representative of the party/political situation that exists within the country. If half the voters vote for one political party but that party wins no-or hardly any-seats in parliament, then that system cannot be said to adequately represent the will of the people. Through the representation not only of political parties but also of independent MPs, an effective parliament should adequately reflect the ideological divisions within society.
Also, there is the question of descriptive representation which implies that parliament is, to some degree, a "mirror of the nation" which should look, feel, think, and act in a way which reflects the people as a whole.
An adequately descriptive parliament would include both men and women, the young and old, the wealthy and poor, and reflect the different religious affiliations, linguistic communities, and ethnic groups within a society.
Making Elections Accessible and Meaningful
Elections are all well and good, but they may mean little to people if it is difficult to vote or if, at the end of the day, their vote makes no difference to the way the nation is governed. The "ease of voting" is determined by such factors as how complex the ballot paper is, see Vote Counting Index, how easy it is for the voter to get to a polling place, see Voting Sites, how up to date the electoral roll is, see Voter Registration Index, and how confident the voter will be that his or her ballot is secret.
Coupled with those concerns is the broader issue of whether an individual's vote makes a difference to the final results. If you know that your preferred candidate has no chance of winning a seat in your particular district, what is the incentive to vote? In some electoral systems the number of "wasted votes" i.e., those which do not go towards the election of any candidate, as distinct from spoiled or invalid votes, which are ballots excluded from the count, can amount to a substantial proportion of the total national vote.
The meaningfulness of elections is determined by how powerful the elected parliament actually is. Hollow or choiceless elections in authoritarian systems, where parliaments have little real influence on the formation of governments or on government policy, are far less important than elections that constitute parliaments, which actually have the power to determine central elements in people's everyday lives. But even within democratic parliamentary systems, the choice of electoral system can influence the legitimacy of institutions.
For example, the Australian Senate between 1919 and 1946 was elected by a highly disproportional electoral system, the Alternative Vote in multi-member districts, which produced lop-sided and unrepresentative results. This tended to undermine the actual legitimacy of the Senate itself in the eyes of both electors and politicians and, some observers argued, also undermined public support for the institutions of federal government in general. After the system was altered to a fairer proportional system, the Single Transferable Vote, in 1948, the Senate began to be perceived as more credible and representative, and thus respect for it and its relative importance in decision-making increased.
Providing Incentives for Conciliation
Electoral systems can be seen not only as ways to constitute governing bodies, but also as a tool of conflict management within a society. Some systems, in some circumstances, will encourage parties to make inclusive appeals for electoral support outside their own core vote base; for instance, even though a party draws its support primarily from black voters, a particular electoral system may give it the incentive to appeal to white, or other, voters. Thus, the party's policy platform would become less divisive and exclusionary, and more unifying and inclusive. Similar electoral system incentives might make parties less ethnically, regionally, linguistically, or ideologically exclusive. Examples of how differing electoral systems have worked as tools of conflict management are given throughout the electoral systems section of the ACE project.
Conversely, electoral systems can encourage voters to look outside their own group and think of voting for parties that traditionally have represented a different group. Such voting behaviour breeds accommodation and community building. Systems that give the voter more than one vote or allow the voter to order candidates preferentially provide the space for electors to cut across pre-conceived social boundaries. Under the 1989 Jordanian electoral system, for example, a Muslim voter could cast two out of their three votes for Islamic candidates while giving an independent Christian their last vote. In the highly ethnically fragmented nation of Papua New Guinea in the 1960s and 1970s, voters were able to list candidates preferentially on the ballot paper, which allowed for a spectrum of alliances and vote trading between competing candidates and different communal groups. When the preferential system was abandoned, groups no longer had an electoral incentive to act cooperatively, and their behaviour consequently became more exclusionary.
Facilitating Stable and Efficient Government
The prospects for a stable and efficient government are determined by many factors other than the electoral system, but the results a system produces can contribute to stability in a number of important respects. The key questions in this regard are whether people perceive the system to be fair, whether government can efficiently enact legislation and govern, and whether the system avoids discriminating against particular parties or interest groups. The perception of whether results are Fair or not varies widely from country to country. Twice in Britain-in 1951 and 1974-the party winning the most votes in the country as a whole won fewer seats than their opponents, but this was considered more a quirk of a basically sound system, see First Past the Post (FPTP), than an outright unfairness which should be reversed. Conversely, in Mongolia in 1992 the system (the Block Vote - see Block Vote) allowed the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party to win 92% of the seats with only 57% of the votes. This was considered by many to be not merely unfair but dangerous to democracy, and the electoral system was consequently changed for the elections of 1996.
Holding the Government and Representatives Accountable
Accountability is one of the bedrocks of representative Government, as it provides a check on individuals, once elected, betraying the promises they made during the campaign. An accountable political system is one where both the government and the elected members of parliament are responsible to their constituents to the highest degree possible. On the broader canvas, voters must be able to influence the shape of the government, either by altering the coalition of parties in power or by throwing out of office a single party, which has failed to deliver.
Well-designed electoral systems facilitate both of these objectives. Accountability involves far more than the mere holding of regular national elections; it also depends on the degree of geographical accountability, which is largely dependent on the size and territorial nature of districts, see Boundary Delimitation Index, as well as the freedom of choice for voters to choose between candidates as opposed to parties, see Alternative Vote, and District Magnitude. In addition, there may be supplementary methods of accountability which can be utilized: in some American States, members of the State legislature can be "recalled" if enough voters in their district demand it.
Other jurisdictions make use of "direct democracy" mechanisms such as referendums and initiatives.
Encouraging Cross-Cutting Political Parties
The weight of evidence from both established and new democracies suggests that longer-term democratic consolidation-i.e. The extent to which a democratic regime is insulated from domestic challenges to the stability of the political order-requires the growth and maintenance of strong and effective parties. Thus the electoral system should encourage this tendency rather than entrench or promote party fragmentation. Similarly, most experts agree that the system should encourage the development of parties that are based on broad political values and ideologies as well as specific policy programmes, rather than narrow ethnic, racial, or regional concerns. As well as lessening the threat of inter-societal conflict, parties based on these broad "cross-cutting cleavages" are more likely to reflect national opinion than those based predominantly on sectarian or regional concerns.
Promoting a Parliamentary Opposition
Effective governance relies not only upon those "in power" but also, almost as much, on those who sit in parliament but are out of government. The electoral system should help ensure the presence of a viable parliamentary opposition grouping that can critically assess legislation, safeguard minority rights, and represent their constituents effectively. Opposition groupings should have enough parliamentary members to be effective, assuming they warrant these members by their performance at the ballot box, and should be able to realistically present an alternative to the current administration. Obviously the strength of parliamentary opposition depends on many factors other than the choice of electoral system, but if the system itself makes parliamentary opposition impotent, democratic governance is inherently weakened. At the same time, the electoral system should hinder the development of a "winner take all" attitude which leaves rulers blind to other views and the needs and desires of opposition voters, and in which both elections and government itself are seen as zero-sum contests.
Cost Considerations
The choice of electoral system has a wide range of administrative consequences, and is ultimately dependent not only on a nation's logistical capacity to hold elections, but also on the amount of money that the country can spend. Simply choosing the most straightforward and least expensive system may well be a false economy in the long run, since a dysfunctional electoral system can have a negative impact on a nation's entire political system and its democratic stability. The choice of electoral system will affect a wide range of administrative issues set out in the following paragraphs.
The Drawing of Electoral Boundaries
Any single-member district system requires the time-consuming and expensive process of drawing boundaries for small constituencies defined by population size, cohesiveness, "community of interest," and contiguity. Furthermore, this is rarely a one-time task since boundaries are regularly adjusted to reflect population changes. First Past The Post (FPTP) and Two-Round System (TRS) systems provide the most administrative headaches on this score. The Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP), and Single-Transferrable Vote (STV) systems also require electorates to be demarcated, but are easier to manage because they use fewer and larger multi-member districts.
At the other end of the scale, List PR systems are often the cheapest and easiest to administer. This is because they either use one single national constituency requiring no boundaries to be drawn, or they use very large multi-member districts that dovetail with pre-existing state or provincial boundaries. Transitional elections in Sierra Leone in 1996 had to be conducted under a national List PR system. The country's civil war and the consequent displacement of citizens meant that, even had they wanted to, electoral authorities did not have the population data necessary to draw smaller single-member districts.
Voter Education
Clearly, the nature of and need for voter education, (see Voter Education Index) will vary dramatically from society to society, but when it comes to educating voters on how to fill out their ballots, there are identifiable differences between each system. The principles behind voting under preferential systems such as STV are quite complex if they are being used for the first time, and voter education must address this issue, particularly if there are compulsory numbering requirements, as is the case in Australia, see The Alternative Vote in Australia. The same is true of MMP systems: after over 50 years of using MMP, many Germans are still under the misapprehension that both their votes are equal, when the reality is that the second "national PR" vote is the overriding determinant of party strength in parliament, see Germany: The Original Mixed Member Proportional System. By contrast, the principles behind categorical, single-vote systems such as FPTP are very easy to understand.
The Count
FPTP and simple closed-list PR systems are easiest to count, as only one vote total figure for each party or candidate is required to work out the results. The MMP system nearly always requires the counting of two ballot papers. STV, requiring numbers to be marked on the ballot, is more complex to count, because it requires continual re-calculations of surplus transfer values and the like.
List PR systems, especially national closed-list systems, are the cheapest to run and require fewest administrative resources. Next come FPTP systems followed by the, STV, and MMP. According to our calculations, the system, which is most likely to put pressure on any county's administrative capacity, is the Two-Round System.
DESIGN COMPONENTS
At the most basic level, electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates. The key variables are the electoral formula used, whether the system is majoritarian or proportional, what mathematical formula is used to calculate the seat allocation, and the district magnitude-not how many voters live in a district, but rather how many members of parliament that district elects.
PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGNERS
One of the clearest conclusions to be gleaned from the comparative study of electoral systems is simply the range and utility of the options available. Too often, constitutional drafters simply choose the electoral system they know best in new democracies. This is the system of the former colonial power if there was one-rather than investigating the most appropriate alternatives. The major purpose of this Web site is to provide enough knowledge for electoral system designers to make informed decisions. This does not mean we would necessarily advocate wholesale changes to existing electoral systems; in fact, the comparative experience of electoral reform to date suggests that moderate reforms, building on those parts of an existing system which work well, are often a better option than jumping to a completely new and unfamiliar system.
There is much to be learned from the experience of others. For example, a country with a First Past The Post (FPTP) system that wished to move to something more proportional while retaining the geographic link to constituents should consider the experience of New Zealand, which adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation system in 1993. A similar country that wanted to keep single-member districts but encourage inter-group accommodation and compromise should look at the experience of Alternative Vote (AV) in the Oceania region, see Papua New Guinea. Any deeply-divided country wishing to make the transition to democracy would be well advised to consider the case of South Africa's 1994 List-PR elections, and the multi-ethnic power-sharing government elected as a result. A country that simply wants to reduce the cost and instability created by a Two-Round System (TRS) should examine the Irish preferential vote option, Ireland: The Archetypal Single Transferable Vote System. In all of these cases, the change from one electoral system to another has had a clear impact upon the politics of that country.
Some practical guidelines for electoral system designers follow.
Keep It Simple
Effective and sustainable electoral system designs are more likely to be those that can be easily understood by the voter and the politician. Too much complexity can lead to misunderstandings, unintended consequences, and voter mistrust of the results.
Don't be Afraid to Innovate
Many of the successful electoral systems used in the world today themselves represent innovative approaches to specific problems, and have been proven to work well. There is much to learn from the experience of others.
Pay Attention to Contextual and Temporal Factors
Electoral systems do not work in a vacuum. Their success depends on a happy marriage of political institutions and cultural traditions. The first point of departure for any would-be electoral system designer should be to ask:
what is the political and social context that I am working within?
The second question might be:
am I designing a permanent system or one that needs to get us through a transitional period?
Do Not Underestimate the Electorate
While simplicity is important, it is equally dangerous to underestimate the ability of voters to comprehend and successfully use a wide variety of different electoral systems. Complex preferential systems, for example, have been used successfully in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region ,while the experience of many recent elections in new democracies has emphasised the important distinction between "functional" literacy and "political" literacy. Even in very poor countries, voters often have, and wish to express, sophisticated political preferences and choices.
Err on the Side of Inclusion
Wherever possible, whether in divided or relatively homogenous societies, the electoral system should produce a parliament that errs on the side of including all significant interests. Regardless of whether minorities are based on ideological, ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional or religious identities, the exclusion of significant shades of opinion from parliaments, particularly in the developing world, has often been catastrophically counter-productive.
Process is a Key Factor in Choice
The way in which a particular electoral system is chosen is also extremely important in ensuring its overall legitimacy. A process in which most or all groups are included, including the electorate at large, is likely to result in significantly broader acceptance of the end result than a decision perceived as being motivated by partisan self-interest alone. Although partisan considerations are unavoidable when discussing the choice of electoral systems, broad cross-party and public support for any institution is crucial to it being accepted and respected.
The reform of the New Zealand electoral system from FPTP to MMP, for example, was preceded by a series of public plebiscites that served to legitimize the final outcome, see New Zealand: A Westminster Democracy Switches to PR. By contrast, the French Socialist Government's decision in 1986 to switch from their existing Two-Round System (TRS)to PR was widely perceived as being motivated by partisan reasons, and was quickly reversed as soon the government lost power in 1988.
Build Legitimacy and Acceptance among All Key Actors
All groupings that wish to play a part in the democratic process should feel that the electoral system to be used is Fair and gives them the same chance as anyone else to be electorally successful. The paramount aim should be that those who "lose" the election cannot translate their disappointment into a rejection of the system itself, nor use the electoral system as an excuse to destabilize the path of democratic consolidation. In 1990 in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas lost control of the government but they accepted the defeat, in part because they accepted the fairness of the electoral system. Like South Africa, Sierra Leone and Mozambique were able to end their bloody civil wars through institutional arrangements that were broadly acceptable to all sides.
Try to Maximize Voter Influence
Voters should feel that elections provide them with a measure of influence over governments and government policy. Choice can be maximized in a number of different ways. Voters may be able to choose between parties, between candidates of different parties, and between candidates of the same party. They might also be able to vote differently when it comes to presidential, upper house, lower house, regional, and local government elections. They should also feel confident that their vote has a genuine impact on government formation, and not just on the composition of the parliament alone.
Balance Against Encouraging Coherent Political Parties
The desire to maximize voter influence should be balanced against the need to encourage coherent and viable political parties. Maximum voter choice on the ballot paper may produce such a fragmented parliament that nobody ends up with the desired result. There is widespread agreement among political scientists that broadly-based, coherent political parties are among the most important factors in the promotion of effective and sustainable democracy.
Long-Term Stability and Short-Term Advantage
When political actors negotiate over a new electoral system they often push proposals which they believe will advantage their party in the coming elections. However, this can often be an unwise strategy, particularly in developing nations, as one party's short-term success or dominance may lead to long-term political breakdown and social unrest. For example, in negotiations prior to the transitional 1994 election, South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) could have reasonably argued for the retention of the existing FPTP electoral system, which would probably have given them, as by far the largest party, a seat bonus over and above their share of the national vote. That they argued for a form of proportional representation, and thus won fewer seats than they could have under FPTP, was a testament to the fact that they saw long-term stability as more desirable than short-term electoral gratification.
Similarly, electoral systems need to be responsive enough to react effectively to changing political circumstances and the growth of new political movements. Even in established democracies, support for the major parties is rarely stable, while politics in new democracies is almost always highly dynamic. This means that a party that benefits from the electoral arrangements at one election may not necessarily benefit at the next.
Don't Think of the Electoral System as a Panacea for All Ills
While it is true that if one wants to change the nature of political competition the electoral system may be the most effective instrument to do so, electoral systems can never be the panacea for the political ills of a country. The overall effects of other variables, particularly a nation's political culture, usually have a much greater impact on democratic prospects than institutional factors such as electoral systems. Moreover, the positive effects of a well-crafted electoral system can be all too easily submerged by an inappropriate constitutional dispensation, the domestic dominance of forces of discord, or the weight of external threats to the sovereignty of the state.
But Conversely Don't Underestimate its Influence
While accepting that throughout the world the social constraints on democracy are considerable, such constraints still leave room for conscious political strategies which may further or hamper successful democratization.
Electoral systems are not a panacea, but they are central to the structuring of stability in any polity. Deft electoral system engineering may not prevent or eradicate deep enmities, but appropriate institutions can nudge the political system in the direction of reduced conflict and greater governmental accountability. In other words, while most of the changes that can be achieved by tailoring electoral systems are necessarily at the margins, it is often these marginal impacts that make the difference between democracy being consolidated or democracy being undermined.
The Electorate's Willingness to Embrace Change
Electoral system change might seem like a good idea to political insiders who understand the flaws of the existing system, but unless proposals for reform are presented in an appropriate way, the public may well reject tinkering with the system, perceiving reform to be nothing more than a case of politicians altering the rules for their own benefit. Most damaging are situations when the change is seen to be a blatant manoeuvre for political gain (as was the case in France in 1986, in Chile in 1989, and in Jordan in 1993. When the system alters so frequently the voters do not quite know where they are, as some have argued is the case in Bolivia.
Avoid Being a Slave to Past Systems
All too often electoral systems inappropriate to a new democracy's needs have been inherited or carried over from colonial times without any thought as to how they will work within the new political realities. Almost all the former British colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, for example, adopted FPTP systems. In many of these new democracies, particularly those facing ethnic divisions, this system proved utterly inappropriate to their needs. It has been similarly argued that many of the former French colonies in West Africa that retained the use of the francophone TRS system, such as Mali in 1992, see Mali: A Two-Round System in Africa suffered damaging polarization as a result. Similarly, many post-communist regimes continue to utilize mandatory turnout or majority requirements inherited from the Soviet era, see Ukraine - The Perils of Majoritarianism in a New Democracy.
Assess Impact of Any New System on Societal Conflict
Electoral systems can be seen not only as mechanisms for choosing parliaments and presidents, but also as a tool of conflict management within a society. Some systems, in some circumstances, will encourage parties to make inclusive appeals for support outside their own core support base. Unfortunately, it is more often the case in the world today that the presence of inappropriate electoral systems serve actually to exacerbate negative tendencies which already exist; for example, by encouraging parties to see elections as "zero-sum" contests and thus to act in a hostile and exclusionary manner to anyone outside their home group. When designing any political institution, the bottom line is that even if it does not help to reduce tensions within society, it should, at the very least, not make matters worse.
Try to Imagine Unusual or Unlikely Contingencies
Too often, electoral systems are designed to avoid the mistakes of the past, especially the immediate past. Care should be taken not to overreact and create a system that goes too far in terms of correcting previous problems.
Furthermore, electoral system designers would do well to pose themselves some unusual questions to avoid embarrassment in the long run:
[ back ]